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  We focus on rice policy reform required for Taiwan’s admission to the WTO, and examine the 
effects, theoretically and empirically, of the re-instrumentation of domestic policy needed to 
achieve environmental objectives when both positive and negative environmental externalities 
exist. Policies that treat non-commodity attributes in agriculture as secondary to existing aims, 
such as income support, are unlikely to result in the desired supplies of environmental goods. 
Those supplies can be achieved at lower government and social costs using policy instruments 
to achieve environmental goals directly. Results are relatively insensitive to the social values 
assigned to environmental goods. 
 
  Key Words: WTO policy reform, multifunctionality, agri-environmental policy, rice policy, 
agricultural trade policy 
 
 
Prior to the signing of the Uruguay Round 
agreement in 1994 and the subsequent creation of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), agricul-
tural policies in industrial countries were largely 
oriented towards income support. Since the mid-
1990s, the policy debate has been increasingly 
dominated by a range of other issues, including 
the impact of agriculture on the environment. 
This shift in policy focus is reflected in the con-
cept of “multifunctionality”—i.e., agriculture as a 
source of multiple outputs that extend beyond 
crop and livestock products into less tangible 
attributes such as environmental quality, land-
scape, and cultural heritage. In many countries, 
agricultural policies are being re-evaluated from 
the perspective of their impact on the supply of 
both commodity and non-commodity attributes. 
This re-examination raises important questions 
about the extent to which domestic policy objec-
tives can be achieved under current disciplines on 
international agricultural trade.  _________________________________________ 
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  It has been common to view the supply of envi-
ronmental attributes as a secondary factor in the 
pursuit of traditional policy objectives, such as 
income support, and to focus policy evaluation on 
a single environmental attribute. We have argued 
elsewhere that an approach that treats environ-
mental aims as subsidiary factors is an outdated 
policy paradigm (Blandford and Boisvert 2002). 
To address new concerns, such as how food is 
produced and environmental issues, a new para-
digm is needed in which policy instruments are 
oriented towards achieving the appropriate supply 
of both non-commodity and commodity attributes 
of agriculture. It is also important that such a 
paradigm be consistent with the liberalization of 
international trade. 
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Objectives 
This paper addresses the key elements of such a 
new policy paradigm and its implications by fo-
cusing on the reforms in Taiwan’s rice policy 
required for the country’s admission to the WTO. 
Through empirical simulations, we examine the 
re-instrumentation of domestic policy to achieve 
environmental objectives. We analyze policies that 
address both positive and negative environmental 
externalities, and we assess the implications of 
trade liberalization for optimal policy choice. 
  In the theoretical section below, we first review 
some key conceptual issues relevant to policy de-
sign. These include the relationship between agri-
cultural production and the supply of non-com-
modity attributes. In this regard, we pay particular 
attention to the fact that both commodity and non-
commodity outputs are produced jointly but not in 
fixed proportions. We also underscore important 
conceptual issues in the valuation of non-com-
modity outputs that are jointly produced. In 
evaluating optimal policy choice, we give particu-
lar attention to instruments that are appropriate 
when it is difficult to observe and monitor the sup-
ply of environmental attributes associated with 
agricultural production. Optimal levels of policy 
instruments are shown to depend on the extent to 
which there are distortions in domestic markets 
caused by either domestic or trade policy measures. 
  We focus on rice policy in Taiwan to illustrate 
the practical significance of these issues for do-
mestic policy reform and trade liberalization. 
Prior to joining the WTO in January 2002, Tai-
wan operated an autarkic rice policy in which 
imports were prohibited. A price support program 
was in place, combined with a land set-aside to 
control supply. As a result of its membership in 
the WTO, a tariff rate quota (TRQ) was introduced 
to permit limited imports of rice. Imports are 
made through a state trading enterprise (STE), 
which controls their release onto the domestic 
market. The price support/set-aside program con-
tinues to be used. Given that a degree of trade 
liberalization has recently occurred, we are able to 
explore the implications of a shift in domestic 
policy from price support to one in which envi-
ronmental objectives are paramount under condi-
tions of autarky, and when the economy is opened 
to limited international competition. 
  A primary objective of this paper is to identify 
the environmental policies that will lead to so-
cially optimal levels of both groundwater recharge 
(a positive externality) and methane gas (a nega-
tive externality) generated by paddy rice produc-
tion. Both of these environmental externalities 
have figured prominently in the debate on the en-
vironmental impact of rice production in Taiwan 
and other Asian countries and the potential impact 
of reforms in domestic and international agricul-
tural policies (Yang 2000; Lin, Pon, and Hsu 
2002; Tsai 1993; Asian Productivity Organization 
2001). Because of the wide range in estimates of 
the social value of these two externalities in the 
literature, we focus our sensitivity analysis of the 





To set the stage for the theoretical development of 
optimal policies for the provision of multifunc-
tional outputs, it is essential to specify a transfor-
mation function (production possibility frontier) 
for the rice sector. Assuming there are fixed re-
source endowments of two inputs (L,  Z), the 
transformation frontier for both rice production 
(q) and two non-commodity environmental out-
puts (E1 and E2) can be represented as 
 
(1)  .  12 (, , ;, ) 0 TqEE LZ =
 
In addition to its regularity properties, two key 
characteristics are required for this transformation 
relation to represent multifunctional agriculture. 
First, the commodity and non-commodity outputs 
must be produced jointly, and second, the non-
commodity outputs must have a “public” good 
nature; they are non-market goods that are non-
rival in consumption.
1 As Boisvert (2001a, 2001b) 
suggests, there are three conditions that lead to 
jointness in production, but in the multifunctional 
case, it is perhaps easiest to think of the joint 
production where non-allocable inputs are used in 
the production of multiple outputs—that is, where 
the outputs are obtained from one and the same 
input.
2 In that case, production is joint in inputs,  
__________________________________________ 
1 In the empirical application below, the two jointly produced non-
commodity outputs, E1 and E2, are positive and negative environmental 
externalities, respectively. Thus, throughout the paper, the terms non-
commodity outputs, multifunctional outputs, and environmental exter-
nalities are used interchangeably. 
2 The case of non-allocable factors could also be discussed within the 
context of technical interdependencies. In fact, “jointness in inputs,” 
which is given when an input simultaneously contributes to the produc-
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and one cannot disentangle the separate contribu-
tion of each input to each product. Thus, total 
input use is not determined by summing inputs 
used by each product; this would result in double 
counting.
3 
 Both of these characteristics have important 
implications for modeling farm-level and market 
behavior. For example, if we assume competitive 
markets and ignore the social value of non-com-
modity outputs, a farmer would maximize profits 
by equating the marginal value product of each 
input with its price. If it is possible to observe the 
levels of production of the non-commodity out-
puts, then we also know that to maximize social 
welfare, it is sufficient to tax (subsidize) the nega-
tive (positive) public good (or externality) at its 
marginal social cost (value) (Baumol and Oates 
1988). These Pigouvian taxes (subsidies) modify 
the first-order conditions for the farmer’s profit 
maximization. 
  Although the logic of the Pigouvian principle is 
particularly compelling at a theoretical level, its 
practical application is less straightforward. In this 
theoretical section, we anticipate a couple of dif-
ficulties in adapting the theory specifically for our 
empirical application to rice in Taiwan. As is seen 
below, the first difficulty stems from the fact that 
the levels of the externalities (public goods) are 
difficult to observe and measure. Thus, it would 
be difficult, if not impossible, to apply the Pigou-
vian principle directly. Further, as in most wealthy 
countries, there are market distortions in the form 
of domestic agricultural policy intervention to 
protect producers’ income, and/or barriers to in-
ternational trade. Baumol and Oates (1988) were 
among the first to show that, under these condi-
tions, the Pigouvian taxes (subsidies) would have 
to be set at levels different from their marginal 
social costs (benefits).
4 Although there are cur-
rently efforts in Taiwan to reduce the level of do-
mestic support and expand international trade, 
market distortions have not been eliminated com-
pletely. Thus, it is important to determine what 
levels of policy instruments ensure the socially 
optimal supply of non-commodity outputs in the 
presence of these distortions. 
 The issue of non-observability of the non-
commodity externalities is addressed by targeting 
multifunctional policy intervention at observable 
variables that are correlated with the externality-
generating process (Rude 2001, Romstad 1999), 
such as the inputs used for agricultural produc-
tion. Indeed, in the absence of market distortions, 
the first-best welfare scenario can still be 
achieved if the appropriate taxes (subsidies) are 
applied to all inputs contributing to the produc-
tion of the non-commodity externalities or “pub-
lic” goods (Holtermann 1976, Griffin and Brom-
ley 1982).
5 Peterson, Boisvert, and de Gorter 
(2002) demonstrate this principle in the case 
where both positive and negative non-commodity 
externalities are jointly produced with agricultural 
commodity outputs. In this paper, we extend that 
type of analysis to the case where there are also 
market distortions. The appropriate modifications 
in the levels of the input taxes (subsidies), for 
__________________________________________ 
4 For example, to recognize that the level of a negative environmental 
externality under imperfect competition is already below its level under 
perfect competition, the socially optimal tax must be set at less than the 
marginal social damage (Lee 1975, Barnett 1980). Gopinath and Wu 
(1999) derive conditions under which the desire of producers of agri-
cultural chemicals to under-produce because of market power would be 
exactly offset by their tendency to over-produce by ignoring the exter-
nality costs of agricultural chemicals. Lichtenberg and Zilberman 
(1986) also examine the welfare impacts of revenue support programs 
(e.g., price support, marketing orders, and import quotas) in agricul-
tural product markets. 
5 Shortle, Horan, and Abler (1998, pp. 574–575) also argue that these 
instruments provide the correct marginal incentives for input use, but 
do not ensure that the set of firms left in the industry will be the effi-
cient ones. Thus, they argue that an additional instrument, one that 
does not distort input levels, may be needed to influence entry and exit 
of firms. This could be in the form of a lump-sum tax on extra-
marginal firms to ensure negative profits if they produce, or in the form 
of a subsidy for not producing that would be larger than their after-tax 
profits. Further, while no such tax would be required for marginal or 
infra-marginal firms, a lump-sum subsidy may be necessary for those 
firms whose entry or exit is influenced by the input taxes or subsidies. 
The necessity for this lump-sum tax or subsidy clearly has implications 
for the re-instrumentation of government policy where there remains a 
desire to support the incomes of agricultural producers.  
_________________________________________________________
tion of several commodities, can be considered one of the reasons for
technical interdependence. See Shumway, Pope, and Nash (1984) and
Leathers (1991) for rigorous mathematical definitions of jointness in
production. 
3 The classical examples of joint products—production of mutton
and wool obtained from sheep, and oil and meal from soybeans—fit
this category nicely, as does the production of milk and landscape
amenities by cows grazing on pasture or corn and nitrate leaching and
runoff due to the application of commercial fertilizer. In the latter two
cases, production of the commodity and non-commodity outputs is not
in fixed proportions. Because we cannot separate the contributions of
cows and pasture to the production of milk and amenities, production
is joint. It is also impossible to disentangle the contribution of fertil-
izer to corn and to leaching runoff. If we count the pollution from
animal waste, there is a third joint product in our dairying example.
Landscape amenities from land in crops would add a third joint com-
modity to the corn production example, in that land’s contribution to
corn production cannot be disentangled from its contribution to ameni-
ties. In the empirical application below, the joint contribution of
irrigation water to the production of paddy rice and groundwater
recharge serves as another example. The same is true for the joint
production of rice and methane. 
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what is now a second-best optimum due to the 
domestic and/or international policy intervention, 
are derived in a manner similar to that when the 
market distortion is in the form of imperfect com-
petition. 
 To derive the optimal second-best multifunc-
tional policy, we develop a two-stage approach 
around a partial equilibrium model of an agricul-
tural market in which there are jointly produced 
non-commodity outputs. In the first stage, the 
government implements the optimal policy design 
by taxing or subsidizing land and other inputs 
(Peterson, Boisvert, and de Gorter 2002).
6 Given 
the levels of the policy instruments announced by 
the government, the representative rice farmer 
makes an optimal decision on the use of agricul-
tural inputs in a second stage. Since this two-stage 
problem is solved through backward induction 
(Tirole 1988), it is convenient to begin with a 
discussion of the second stage. 
 
Optimal Decisions of Producers, 
Given Domestic Support Policy 
 
To understand the implications of domestic sup-
port for optimal multifunctional policy design, we 
must formulate the producer’s decision problem 
within the context of the specific design of agri-
cultural support policy for rice in Taiwan using a 
strategy similar to Fraser (2003) in modeling the 
effects of a reduction in domestic support for ag-
riculture in Europe. In Taiwan, there is both a 
price support program (the limited purchase sup-
port program) and a land set-aside program, the 
“Rice Paddy Utilization Adjustment Program” 
(RPUAP) (Huang 2001). There is a payment for 
each hectare set aside, but the government also 
limits purchases of rice at the support price to a 
fixed quantity per hectare. This is an important 
feature of the policy because it is likely that the 
supply-inducing price at the margin will be the 
domestic market-clearing price, rather than the 
support price. 
 The representative rice farmer is assumed to 
maximize profit, where the farmer’s revenue in-
cludes market sales of rice, rice sold to the gov-
ernment at the support price, and payments for the 
set-aside land area. The farmer’s decision prob-
lem is 
(2)  { }
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where F(.) is the production function for rice, p is 
the equilibrium market price for rice, α is the 
mandatory proportion of total land, L, in rice pro-
duction, (1 – α) is the proportion of land enrolled 
in the set-aside program, Z is the other input used 
in rice production,  P  is the per unit government 
purchase price, Q  is the government purchase 
quantity of per hectare,  s P  is the per hectare set-
aside payment,  l  is the price of land, and  P z P  is 
the price of a purchased input. Assuming that land 
contributes to the production of the positive ex-
ternality, E1 from equation (1), and that Z contrib-
utes to the negative externality, E2 from equation 
(1), s and t are the subsidy and tax, respectively, 
on inputs needed to ensure the appropriate pro-
duction of the non-commodity environmental 
output variables. The levels of these policy in-
struments are determined in the first stage of the 
policy design problem described below. The first 
term in the profit function is market revenue; the 
second term is the revenue from government pur-
chases based on maximum per hectare quantity 
Q ; the third term is the revenue from RPUAP; 
and the last two terms are the subsidy revenue and 
tax cost to the farmer associated with input use.  
  The first-order necessary conditions for an inte-
rior solution are 
(3)  ()
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 The economic intuition behind equations (3) 
and (4) may be demonstrated by comparing the 
marginal cost and benefit of the use of each input. 
For optimal land use, equation (3), the first term 
is the marginal revenue from selling rice on the 
market; the second term is the marginal payment 
received through the price support program; the 
third term is the marginal payment for the land set 
aside; and the fourth term is the marginal subsidy 
for the contribution of land in production to the 
supply of a “positive” non-commodity environ-
__________________________________________ 
6 For simplicity of exposition, only two inputs are considered in this 
conceptual analysis. The results extend in a straightforward fashion to 
the four inputs (fertilizer, labor, land, and water) included in the em-
pirical model subsequently developed for paddy rice in Taiwan.
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mental output. The solution of the farmer’s opti-
mization problem requires that these combined 
marginal (net) contributions of land to profit are 
equated to the price of land. Assuming that the 
marginal product of land is declining, and since 
the three terms involving policy instruments are 
positive, the optimal use of land will tend to be 
higher than under competitive market conditions 
in the absence of a price policy and an environ-
mental policy that explicitly recognizes the social 
value of the positive non-commodity externality. 
In contrast, we can see from equation (4) that the 
optimal level of the purchased input will tend to 
be below what it would be in a competitive mar-
ket because of the assumed effect of the use of the 
input on the output of the negative non-commodity 
externality (equation 4). The value of the mar-
ginal product of Z is equated to its price plus the 
tax on Z. 
Optimal Environmental Policy Design 
Given the solution to the rice farmer’s profit-
maximizing problem, second-best optimal envi-
ronmental policies can be derived by maximizing 
the social welfare function. If social welfare is 
represented by the sum of consumers’ and pro-
ducers’ surpluses, less governmental budget costs 
and the net value of the non-commodity environ-
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where p(h) is the demand curve for rice, P(Q
c) is 
the equilibrium price, and π is the farmer’s indi-
rect profit function. The function B(.) is the total 
benefit function associated with the positive envi-
ronmental externality, and the function D(.) is the 
total damage function associated with the nega-
tive externality.
7 
  Thus, the first two terms of equation (5) repre-
sent consumers’ surplus; the third term is the profit 
of the representative rice farm; and the fourth and 
fifth terms are the benefit and damage functions 
associated with the positive and negative non-
commodity externalities that are supplied jointly 
with a given level of inputs in rice production. 
The remaining two terms represent government 
taxes and subsidies, respectively, on the two agri-
cultural inputs. 
  We apply Shephard’s lemma to determine the 
optimal levels of the two new policy instruments 
by partially differentiating equation (5) with re-
spect to t and s. The first-order necessary condi-
tions for an interior solution to the maximization 
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Making the reasonable assumption that the partial 
derivatives of the input levels with respect to the 
tax and subsidy are non-zero, the levels of t and s 
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________ 
7 There are two issues that must be addressed in specifying these envi-
ronmental benefit and cost functions. The first has to do with non-
market valuation. As the list of non-trade concerns has expanded, there
has been a recognition of the difficulties posed in estimating the non-
market values for jointly produced non-commodity outputs of agricul-
ture. It has been noted by Hoehn and Randall (1989) and Carson, Flo-
res, and Hanemann (1998) that, regardless of whether the non-market 
values are estimated by indirect methods, such as averting behavior and
hedonic price approaches, or by direct methods, such as contingent
valuation, serious problems can arise if net social benefits are estimated 
by summing individual values of the separate non-market goods, each 
derived independently using conventional valuation procedures. Car-
son, Flores, and Hanemann (1998) motivate their work by noting one 
disturbing aspect of valuation efforts: “…the observation that if one 
summed the public’s estimated values for individual environmental 
amenities, the sum may exceed disposable income” (p. 314). By im-
plicitly ignoring the effects of joint production and policy interactions, 
such a procedure will systematically overstate benefits or understate 
costs. Recently, Randall (2002) proposed a strategy for addressing 
these issues, but to date, no empirical work is available. Therefore, in 
the empirical analysis that follows, it is necessary to assume that the 
cross derivative between E1 and E2 in the social value function for the 
externalities [V(E1, E2, I), where I is real income] is small. Further, our 
policies are likely to have only a small effect on national income. Thus, 
we can approximate the value function as V ≅ B(E1) – D(E2). 
  The second issue relates to the E’s being unobservable, in which 
case we assume that they are stochastic and are contingent on both L
and Z. Then, as Shortle and Dunn (1986) point out, if B(.) and D(.) are 
replaced by their expected values, taxes and subsidies applied to all 
inputs affecting the E’s are preferred to taxes and subsidies applied to 
forecasts of the E’s.
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that satisfy these first-order conditions are the 
ones that also satisfy 
(8) 
12 [(
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EE
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Solving equations (8) and (9) for t and s yields the 
following expressions for the optimal levels of the 
tax and subsidy: 
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  The intuition behind the two parts to equation 
(10) is straightforward: the optimal input subsidy 
(tax) is determined in part by the products of the 
marginal contributions of each input to the pro-
duction of the externalities and the marginal bene-
fit or damage of each externality. Thus, since both 
inputs contribute to the production of both exter-
nalities, it is impossible to determine ex ante if 
the subsidy (tax) is positive (negative). For exam-
ple, the optimal tax for the non-land input may 
well be negative if that input’s marginal contribu-
tion to the benefits associated with the positive 
externality outweighs its marginal contribution to 
the cost of damage associated with the negative 
externality. Whether the subsidy on land is posi-
tive or negative depends on similar considera-
tions, but, in addition, the size of the land subsidy 
depends in part on the distorting effect of the lim-
ited price support and the land set-aside payment. 
To underscore the effect of market distortions on 
the level of “Pigouvian” type taxes or subsidies, it 
may be seen from equation (10b) that the land 
subsidy necessary to ensure the optimal level of 
the multiple externalities will decrease if the level 
of domestic support (either the price support or 
the set-aside payment) increases. Without the 
domestic support, the optimal subsidy for land is 
equal to the net effect of land’s net marginal con-
tribution to both externalities, similar to the re-
sults of Peterson, Boisvert, and de Gorter (2002). 
Opening the Economy to International Trade 
The optimal environmental policy design repre-
sented in equation (10) applies to a closed econ-
omy, and was applicable to the rice market prior 
to Taiwan’s admission to the WTO, which, in 
2003, led to rice imports under a tariff rate quota 
(TRQ). For this reason, we must also determine 
how the optimal multifunctional taxes and subsi-
dies are affected by the new policy regime. To 
understand the TRQ, we follow the argument 
developed both algebraically and graphically by 
Abbott and Paarlberg (1998) for a small import-
ing country. The small country assumption is jus-
tified in our case because the minimum annual 
commitment for imports of rice in Taiwan is only 
50,652 tons. To model the TRQ regime, we must 
recognize that there are three possible outcomes. 
Under the first, where imports equal the minimum 
access commitment, the TRQ acts like a quota in 
which a tariff is also levied. Accordingly, the op-
timal environmental policy for this small open 
economy is similar to that in equation (10), except 
that the domestic price is now determined by the 
sum of domestic production plus imports, rather 
than by just domestic production as in the closed 
economy case. Second, if desired imports are less 
than the minimum access commitment, then the 
below quota tariff would be effective. The TRQ 
acts like a pure tariff in this case, and the domes-
tic price is the world price plus the within in-
quota tariff. For the third outcome, imports can 
exceed the minimum access level—in which case 
the higher out-of-quota tariff would apply.
8 As is 
seen in the empirical analysis below, it is the first 
outcome, where imports equal the minimum ac-
cess commitment and the TRQ acts like a quota in 
which a tariff is also levied, that is applicable to 




To illustrate the economic impact of policy 
changes, a computable partial equilibrium model 
is used to represent the Taiwanese rice market. 
This framework has been widely used for analyz-
ing the effects of agricultural policies (Floyd 
1965, Maier 1991, Gardner 1987). A special fea-
_________________________________________ 
8 Both Krutilla (1991) and Peterson, Boisvert, and de Gorter (2002) 
demonstrate that the results for analyses of these types of trade policies 
are slightly different for the large country case because the government 
can exploit the terms-of-trade effect of policy intervention. 
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ture of the approach is that the various market 
levels in the vertical production/consumption 
chain are considered simultaneously. The approach 
is adopted primarily because agriculture represents 
only about two percent of Taiwan’s domestic 
product—thus, it would be unlikely that there 
would be noticeable general equilibrium effects 
from changes in rice policy. Furthermore, similar 
partial equilibrium models have been used else-
where to examine the effects of TRQs and the 
reduction in domestic agricultural support (e.g., 
Abbott and Paarlberg 1998, and Boughner and de 
Gorter 1999). Finally, as demonstrated above, the 
optimal environmental polices can be analyzed in 
conjunction with the adoption of a TRQ by mak-
ing some rather straightforward changes in the 
partial equilibrium framework. In order to isolate 
the impact of trade liberalization, we examine 
scenarios for both a closed economy and an open 
economy. We benchmark our empirical model by 
assuming a closed economy with the domestic 
policies in place in 2001. We use 13 equations to 
characterize the essential features of the Taiwan-
ese rice market (Table 1). 
  As with comparable models, data to estimate the 
parameters of input supply equations, etc., are not 
readily available. Thus, we employ reasonable   
estimates of the parameters derived from the lit-
erature, relying particularly on studies from Japan,  
other Asian countries, and the United States.   
As stated above, since a primary focus of the pa-
per is on optimal environmental policies, we fo-
cus our sensitivity analysis of the empirical re-




Input Supply Equations 
 
Equations (11) through (14) (Table 1) represent 
the supply system for inputs: farmland (L), farm 
labor (Z), fertilizer (FP), and irrigation water (W), 
respectively. The value used for the supply elas-
ticity of land ( l ε ) is 0.55. This is based on re-
search for the Japanese rice industry (Ohba 2001) 
and is towards the low end of the range of 0.0 to 
2.0 found in the literature (Floyd 1965, Gardner 
1987). Individual irrigation associations have 
control over the allocation of irrigation, and the 
transfer of land in and out of agriculture must be 
approved by a government-sponsored, county-
level farmers’ organization. For this reason, we 
believe it is appropriate to assume a supply of 
land that is relatively inelastic to its price or rental 
value. 
  In past studies for the United States, estimates 
of the elasticity of labor supply to agriculture 
have ranged from 1.0 to 3.0 (Gisser 1971, Rosine 
and Helmberger 1974). A study by Tyrchniewicz 
and Schuh (1969) found labor supply elasticities 
ranging from around 0.7 in the short run to 
around 1.5 in the longer run. We assumed a value 
toward the low end of this range, 0.8, for the Tai-
wanese rice industry.
9 
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  Supplies of purchased inputs, such as fertilizer, 
are usually much more elastic than are those of 
other agricultural inputs. The range of fertilizer 
supply elasticities found in the literature is from  () ( 1 ) ls l l F pQ P P Ps P α+ α − + − α+ α =  
(16)  __________________________________________ 
9 At the recommendation of a reviewer who noted that these estimates 
of the supply elasticity of labor are dated, we searched the literature for 
more recent estimates—to no avail. We did, however, perform some 
sensitivity analysis and determined that estimated changes in net social 
welfare and all other important variables from the model are extremely 
insensitive to changes in the supply elasticity for labor. There are two 
explanations for this result. The first, and perhaps most important, is 
that all policy impacts are compared to a 2001 baseline. To be consis-
tent with this baseline, the model is initially calibrated using the as-
sumed values for factor supply elasticities. All policy impacts are 
measured relative to this calibrated baseline. The second reason for the 
relative insensitivity of the results is that, as is seen below, labor is the 
only factor that does not contribute to the production of the environ-
mental goods, and thus it is neither taxed nor subsidized in the optimal 
environmental policy.  
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0.5 to 10 (Gardner 1987). We assumed a supply 
elasticity of 2.0 for the Taiwanese rice industry. 
  We found no studies that provide empirical es-
timates of the supply elasticity of water for irriga-
tion, but irrigation associations control most of 
the irrigation water used in rice production in 
Taiwan. Therefore, it seemed appropriate to as-
sume that the supply of irrigation water would be 
quite unresponsive to the imputed value of water 
for rice production—so an elasticity of 0.3 is used 
in our analysis. 
Input Demand Equations 
Equations (15) through (18) (Table 1) are the de-
rived input demand equations for farmland, labor, 
fertilizer, and water, respectively. These equations 
are derived from the first-order necessary condi-
tions in the optimal decision model for rice farm-
ers discussed above. Each variable is as defined in 
the theoretical model, and the additional term, Fi, 
is the partial derivative with respect to input i of 
the Cobb-Douglas production function, which is 
embedded in the market-clearing equation (19) 
(Table 1). As is discussed below, three of the in-
puts (fertilizer, land, and water) contribute to the 
production of the two environmental externalities. 
Thus, demands for these factors are affected by 
taxes or subsidies assigned to them by the gov-
ernment (t, sl, and sw, respectively). The demand 
for land is also affected by the level of price sup-
port, the set-aside payment, and the proportion of 
land that is set aside. Based on data published by 
the Council of Agriculture for 2001, the propor-
tion of land suitable for paddy that is actually 
allocated to rice production (α) is around 0.7. In 
Taiwanese dollars (NT$), the government’s pur-
chase price for rice ( P ) was NT$21,000/ton; the 
maximum amount that the government would 
purchase at this price was 1.26 tons/ha. The set-
aside payment per hectare (Ps) was NT$41,000/ha 
(Council of Agriculture 2001). These policy pa-
rameters and environmental taxes and subsidies 
are set at various levels, or eliminated altogether, 
in the policy scenarios described below. In cali-
brating the model, the domestic policy variables 
are set at their 2001 levels, and the environmental 
taxes and subsidies are set to zero. 
The Production Function, Rice Demand, 
and Market-Clearing Condition 
Equation (19) (Table 1) is the market-clearing 
condition for rice production (the terms on both 
sides of the first equals sign) and consumption. We 
were somewhat limited in our choice of rice pro-
duction functions because only time-series data 
on the cost of rice production were available. This 
is one of the primary reasons for specifying that 
the production function for rice has a Cobb-
Douglas form. Another reason for the choice, 
however, is that the Cobb-Douglas form has per-
formed well in several other studies where pro-
duction functions were estimated from Taiwanese 
rice data (Tsai and Wann 1995). Since the pro-
duction elasticities of the inputs for the constant 
returns to scale version of the Cobb-Douglas 
functional form are cost shares, we used time-
series data on the cost of rice production between 
1952 and 2001 to estimate the parameters of the 
production function. Average cost shares over 
that period for farmland, labor, fertilizer, and wa-
ter were 0.19 (cl), 0.57 (cz), 0.22 (cfp), and 0.02 
(cw), respectively. 
  In the market-closing condition, we also assume 
that there is a fixed proportional yield of table rice 
from raw rice. This is a common assumption for 
the relationship between vertical market levels in 
the industrial organization literature (Tirole 
1988). Based on the conversion rate published by 
the Council of Agriculture in 2001, the value of β 
in equation (19) is set at 0.7. Equation (20) (Table 
1) defines a fixed-proportion relationship between 
the farm price for rice and the consumer price. 
  Equation (21) (Table 1) is the linear demand 
function for rice. The consumer price is deter-
mined by the amount of rice available in the do-
mestic market—domestic production in the au-
tarky case and the sum of domestic production 
and imported rice (M) released onto the domestic 
market in the with-trade case. Parameter b is cali-
brated based on the assumption that the consumer 
demand elasticity for rice is -0.1 (Yang and Chen 
2000). The low demand elasticity reflects the fact 
that rice is the main staple food in Taiwan; given 
the relatively high level of consumer income, de-
mand is insensitive to changes in the price of rice. 
Modeling the Environmental Externalities 
Although non-trade concerns have traditionally 
figured in the debate on agricultural trade policy, 
the range of non-trade concerns has broadened 
dramatically in recent years. Much of this has 
been associated with the characterization of agri-
culture as a multifunctional activity. In this re-
gard, Taiwan’s identification of non-commodity 
outputs in paddy rice production is no exception. 
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Some of the issues identified in Taiwan are com-
mon to the production system used to grow rice 
throughout monsoon Asia. 
  In the monsoon environment, rice is grown in 
saturated soil that is often flooded throughout 
most of the growing season. In addition to provid-
ing optimum growing conditions for the rice, the 
production system has the potential to affect 
(positively and negatively) the natural environ-
ment. It may affect the frequency and intensity of 
flooding, groundwater recharge, soil erosion, and 
water and air quality. In addition, there may be 
important social and economic externalities relat-
ing to landscape and recreation. (See Blandford, 
Boisvert, and Fulponi [2003] for a broader dis-
cussion of multifunctional attributes.) 
  For this reason, and to be able to demonstrate 
the interaction between environmental policy de-
signs within the context of domestic and interna-
tional trade policy reform in agriculture, we focus 
on a single important positive externality (ground-
water recharge) and a single important negative 
environmental externality (methane emission) 
associated with paddy rice production. These ex-
ternalities are chosen not only because they are of 
particular interest in Taiwan’s agricultural re-
search and policy circles, but also because work 
exists relating to their non-market values. 
  The Positive Externality: Groundwater Re-
charge. One major consequence of the ponded 
conditions of paddy rice production is the percola-
tion of water into the soil. The rate of percolation 
varies, depending upon soil type, but water moving 
downward has a recharge effect on groundwater. 
This will replace water withdrawn from the aqui-
fer, raise the water table, or increase the outflow 
from the aquifer to springs, streams, or the sea 
(Ohnishi and Nakanishi 2001). It may also reduce 
substantially the risk of land subsidence (Barends, 
Brouwer, and Schroeder 1995). Recharge is influ-
enced strongly by the status of the underlying aqui-
fer. If the aquifer is in overdraft, i.e., the phreatic 
surface is declining over time, the recharge water 
may, according to some, be considered to have a 
value equal to that of water stored above ground. If 
the aquifer is not stressed by the rate of extraction, 
recharge may simply sustain the base flow of 
springs and streams fed from the aquifer. This may 
have significant environmental value, e.g., main-
taining fish populations, but the value is likely to 
be lower than for an aquifer in overdraft. 
  The first step in modeling groundwater recharge 
is to specify how recharge relates to input use. 
Based on the findings from an agricultural engi-
neering study of rice production (Matsuno et al. 
2002), we assume that groundwater recharge is 
directly related to total land planted to paddy rice 
and the intensity of the application of irrigation 
water. Following a strategy similar to Peterson, 
Boisvert, and de Gorter (2002), we model ground-
water recharge as a semi-logarithmic function, 
equation (22) (Table 1). By using this function, we 
are able to recognize that an increase in the inten-
sity of the application of irrigation water per unit of 
land area will affect groundwater recharge, as will 
an increase in overall land use. We can see this by 
writing the term in braces from equation (22) as 







which is also equal to W
2/3 (αL)
1/3. Thus, ground-
water recharge increases with the use of both in-
puts (land and water), but at a decreasing rate. 
The non-market value of groundwater recharge is 
included in the model through equation (22) by 
multiplying the right-hand side of the equation by 
an estimate of the non-market value, willingness 
to pay (WTP). 
  For this analysis, the estimates for the value of 
groundwater (WTP) are derived from values re-
ported by Chen (2001) and Chen, Wu, and Chang 
(2002). In both studies, contingent valuation 
methods (CVMs) are used to estimate the value of 
groundwater recharge associated with Taiwanese 
rice production. However, while Chen, Wu, and 
Chang (2002) focus only on the groundwater re-
charge value, Chen (2001) estimates the value of 
groundwater jointly with the value of other multi-
functional outputs of rice production. Thus, it is 
difficult to disentangle the effects of groundwater 
recharge in this latter study. In an attempt to rec-
oncile the two estimates of value, Boisvert et al. 
(2003) converted measures of total value to mar-
ginal values and generated estimates that were 
weighted by household type and county. Based on 
this analysis, the average willingness to pay for an 
additional one percent change in groundwater 
recharge was estimated to be NT$28,522, with an 
upper bound of NT$37,656 and a lower bound of 
NT$19,389. The range of the estimates of will-
ingness to pay for groundwater recharge form the 
basis for a sensitivity analysis of the empirical 
results obtained from our model. 
  The Negative Environmental Externality: Meth-
ane Production. Although nitrate residuals are 
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among the most widely recognized sources of 
agricultural pollution, there are numerous test 
results (e.g., from data supplied by the Kaoshung 
Irrigation Association) to suggest that current 
levels of nitrates in Taiwan’s drinking water are 
within acceptable levels of concentration. For this 
reason, we focus on another issue—methane 
emissions from paddy rice fields. 
  Methane is produced during rice production by 
aerobic decomposition of soil organic material in 
flooded rice fields. Almost 90 percent of methane 
generated and oxidized by aerobic bacteria in the 
soil reaches the atmosphere, thus contributing to 
greenhouse gas emissions. In 1990, it was esti-
mated that paddy rice contributed 16 percent of 
total methane emissions worldwide (U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency [EPA] 1999). One 
important factor affecting methane generation is 
the water supply system; deepwater rice fields 
will generate significant amounts of methane. 
Some of the methane bubbles up through the wa-
ter, but most reaches the atmosphere by traveling 
up the rice stalk through the plant’s vascular sys-
tem (Hyman 2001). For this reason, less methane 
is produced in upland areas because of the short-
age of water during the rice production season 
(EPA 1999, 2002). Other factors that affect meth-
ane emissions from rice production are soil qual-
ity, soil temperature, fertilizer practices, and rice 
variety. For example, if farmers use biogas resi-
dues instead of barnyard manure in rice produc-
tion, methane emission can be reduced by 24 to 
62 percent. If farmers use hybrid rice seed, meth-
ane emission can be mitigated by 10 percent 
(Asia Development Bank 1998). 
  Because methane emissions involve an aerobic 
process, we assume that fertilizer, water, and land 
used in rice production contribute to methane 
emissions, as in equation (23) (Table 1). This 
specific formulation is based on estimates of total 
methane emissions by Yang (2000) and Lin et al. 
(2002). Average total emissions from rice produc-
tion in these two studies were estimated to be 
35,500 tons. Further, from a recent study of meth-
ane abatement in China (Asia Development Bank 
1998), it is estimated that a one percent change in 
rice production will change methane emissions by 
roughly two percent. By combining these sources 
of information with the input production elastic-
ities from the production function, we can relate 
methane emissions to input use. 
 The negative value of methane emissions to 
society is estimated as the product of average 
abatement cost (r in equation (23)) and total 
emissions. Our estimates of average abatement 
costs depend on the abatement technology avail-
able and on the total decrease in the amount of 
methane. According to a recent study of rice pro-
duction in China, the most efficient abatement 
strategy is through effective manure management, 
involving an abatement cost of NT$2,890/ton; a 
much less efficient strategy is through the adop-
tion of hybrid rice, with an abatement cost of 
NT$45,356/ton. Another possible strategy to de-
crease methane emissions is through the use of a 
dry nursery, for which the abatement cost is 
NT$13,600/ton (Asia Development Bank, 1998). 
Again, these values are used in evaluating the 
sensitivity of our results with respect to the social 
cost of methane emissions. 
 
The Results of the Policy Analysis 
Table 2 contains a summary of the parameter and 
policy variables used in the empirical model. Af-
ter calibrating the functional constants ki for each 
equation based on the observed data and the given 
parameters, we can solve for the optimal levels of 
the 13 endogenous variables (L, Z, FP, W, Pl, PZ, 
Pfp, Pw, Q
d, P, PP, GW, ME) simultaneously using 
equations (11) through (23).   
  Table 3 provides a summary of key results from 
the policy simulations. Columns A to C relate to  
 
Table 2. Parameters and Policy Variables 
Supply elasticity of land, εl = 0.55  
Supply elasticity of labor, εz = 0.80 
Supply elasticity of fertilizer, εfp = 2.00 
Supply elasticity of water, εw = 0.3 
Proportion of land for production, α = 0.71 
Ratio of raw rice to table rice, β = 0.70 
Payment for land set aside, Ps  = 41,000 (NT$/ha.) 
Government purchase price,  P  = 21,000 (NT$/T)   
Government purchase quantity,  Q  = 1.268 (T/ha.) 
Production elasticity of land, cl  = 0.19 
Production elasticity of labor, cz = 0.57 
Production elasticity of fertilizer, cfp = 0.22 
Production elasticity of water, cw = 0.02 
Contribution of water to groundwater recharge, dw = 0.67 
Contribution of land to groundwater recharge, dl = 0.33
Elasticity of water to methane emissions, ew = 0.042 
Elasticity of fertilizer to methane emissions, efp = 0.462  
Elasticity of land to methane emissions, el = 0.40 
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Table 3. Simulations of the Effects of Alternative Agricultural, Environmental, and Trade Policies 
on the Taiwanese Rice Market 














   (A)  (B)   (C)    (D)  (E)  (F) 
Optimal Environmental Policy         
Land subsidy (NT$/ha)  0   -3,084   339   0   -4,279   354  
Water subsidy (NT$/ton)  0  0.0399  0.0401  0  0.0407   0.0363 
Fertilizer  tax  (NT$/ton)  0  57 59  0  59 60 
Resource Allocation  % Change from Base (A) 
Consumption (thousand tons table rice)  1,207  -0.1  0.3  0.5  0.3  0.7 
Production (thousand tons raw rice)  1,724  -0.1  0.3  -3.7  -3.9  -3.5 
Land planted to rice (1,000 ha)  332  0.0  7.6  -0.4  -0.4  4.6 
Labor (1,000 persons)  231  0.5  -1.3  -3.9  -3.2  -4.8 
Water (10
7 tons)  804 11.1 10.4  -2.1  9.8  8.0 
Fertilizer (1,000 tons)  829  0.3 -2.4  -5.9 -5.2 -7.6 
Groundwater  recharge  278 5.9 9.5  -1.5 4.4 6.8 
Methane emissions (10
3  tons)  35.5 -0.9  2.3  -3.0 -4.3 -1.5 
Prices and Revenue         
Land rent (NT$1,000/ha)  27  -6.5  -38.9  -0.8  -9.9  -41.9 
Wages  (NT$1,000/person)  78  0.6 -1.6  -4.9 -4.0 -6.0 
Fertilizer price (NT$1,000/ton)  8  0.2 -1.2  -2.6 -3.9 -8.6 
Water  price  (NT$/ton)  0.08 41.9 39.1  -6.7 36.6 29.1 
Farm price of rice (NT$1,000/ton)  18.3  1.3  -3.2  -5.2  -3.3  -7.3 
Farm revenue (NT$10
8)
a 383  -1.7 -18.9    -8.9 -25.2 -16.7 
Welfare Analysis         
Consumer surplus (NT$10
10)  19.7  -0.3 0.6  1.0 0.7 1.5 
Producer surplus (NT$10
10)  2.1  -1.9 -21.4  -5.7  -8.9 -27.6 
Domestic payments (NT$10
7)  674  -5.0 -93.6  5.5 -17.2 -94.2 
Groundwater recharge value (NT$10
7) 947 0.3 0.5  -0.1 0.2 0.3 
Methane emission value (NT$10
7)  10.3 -0.9  2.3  -3.0 -4.3 -1.5 
Social welfare (NT$10
10)  22.1 0.1 1.4  0.7 0.5 2.1 
aIncludes domestic policy payments. 
 
simulations performed under the assumption of 
autarky, and Columns D to F reflect limited imports 
whose allocation is controlled by the state trading 
entity.
10 
  Columns A and D provide the bases for com-
parison under the closed economy and limited 
trade options, in that each relates to the “current 
support” case—a price and income support policy 
with a land set-aside. Columns C and F relate to 
the case in which price and income support objec-
tives are abandoned, being replaced by a policy in 
which environmental objectives alone are pur-
sued. To provide a further point of comparison, 
columns B and E show what happens if the gov-
ernment keeps its existing price and income sup-
port instruments, but also uses subsidies and taxes 
to address the environmental externalities. 
  The key conclusions that can be drawn from 
these results are as follows: 
__________________________________________ 
10 In all simulations where limited imports are allowed under the 
tariff rate quota, the quota is binding (e.g., imports are equal to the 
minimum access commitment). Since the lower, in-quota tariff rate is 
set at zero in Taiwan, there are no tariff revenues collected.
#  Achieving environmental objectives by replac-
ing the current price support policies with envi-
ronmental policies would require the payment 
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of land and water subsidies, and the imposition 
of a tax on fertilizer. Under the valuations as-
sumed for the environmental goods, water use 
would expand by about 9.5 percent and the 
value of groundwater recharge would also in-
crease. Fertilizer use would decline by about 2.4 
percent. The amount of land in rice production 
would rise by 7.6 percent, in part to foster the 
increase in groundwater recharge. 
#  Contrary to what one might expect, this policy 
re-instrumentation would actually increase rice 
production slightly, and the amount of land in 
rice production would rise by 7.6 percent, in 
part to foster the increase in groundwater re-
charge. As mentioned above, this result is due in 
large part to the design of the pre-WTO price 
support policy. The support price was paid only 
on a fixed quantity of production per hectare. 
Thus, even prior to policy reform, the supply-
inducing price at the margin was the domestic 
market-clearing price, rather than the support 
price. 
#  The replacement of price and income support 
objectives by environmental objectives has sig-
nificant redistributive implications. There is a 
substantial reduction in transfers to producers: 
since the current large payments to producers 
are not needed to achieve the environmental 
benefits/reduce the environmental costs associ-
ated with rice production, the domestic pay-
ments fall by 93.6 percent. The elimination of 
income support, in the form of set-aside pay-
ments and government purchases of rice, causes 
imputed land rents to decline substantially, by 
an estimated 38.9 percent. 
#  The pursuit of environmental objectives is wel-
fare-enhancing under all the cases analyzed. 
Producers lose, consumers gain, and government 
payments are reduced. Net social welfare in-
creases once environmental externalities are in-
ternalized in the autarky case, but the gains are 
higher under trade liberalization. This is consis-
tent with the view that trade liberalization is 
welfare-enhancing overall, and suggests that, at 
least for the case analyzed, the pursuit of envi-
ronmental aims is not inconsistent with freer 
trade. 
#  The joint pursuit of redistributive and environ-
mental objectives is inferior, in terms of net so-
cial welfare, to a policy that attempts to achieve 
environmental objectives alone. Because the 
multifunctional non-commodity outputs are not 
produced in fixed proportion with agricultural 
output, the compensation of producers associ-
ated with the income support objective implic-
itly values groundwater recharge below its so-
cial value and underestimates the social cost of 
methane abatement. This is best seen by the 
magnitude of the environmental taxes and sub-
sidies in the presence of domestic distortions 
created by existing policies. Given these distor-
tions, environmental objectives can be achieved 
only through a land tax, rather than a land sub-
sidy, in conjunction with a water subsidy. 
  The results in Table 3 were derived using the 
mean of the valuation for groundwater recharge 
(WTP = NT$28,522) and with the cost of meth-
ane emissions associated with the most efficient 
management strategy (Me = NT$2,890). In order 
to examine the robustness of our conclusions, we 
conducted a sensitivity analysis using the closed-
economy scenario as a point of reference (Table 
4). The results in Table 4 are obtained using the 
high and low valuations, respectively, from will-
ingness to pay studies, as derived by Boisvert et 
al. (2003). The abatement costs associated with 
methane emissions are unchanged from those 
used in generating the results in Table 3 for these 
two simulations. The table also gives the results 
obtained when the alternative high and very high 
abatement costs, associated with alternative man-
agement strategies discussed above, are assumed. 
The valuation attached to groundwater recharge is 
that used in deriving the results in Table 3. 
  The key points to be drawn from the sensitivity 
analysis are as follows: 
#  As might be expected, a lower valuation for 
groundwater recharge results in a reduction in 
the land and water subsidies required to achieve 
environmental objectives; a higher valuation re-
sults in larger subsidies. 
# As the economic costs associated with methane 
emissions increase, the optimal tax on fertilizer 
rises, and land subsidies are replaced by land 
taxes. These measures are needed to reduce the 
amount of land under rice cultivation, and the  
production of rice. 
#  Although the net effect varies, social welfare is 
increased by the pursuit of environmental 
objectives in comparison to current policies.   
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Table 4. Sensitivity of the Policy Simulations to Alternative Values for the Environmental Variables 
  SCENARIOS WITH ALTERNATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES
a
   (A)  (C)  (G)  (H)  (I)  (J) 
Parameter Value        
WTP  --  28,522 37,656 19,389 28,522 28,522 
Me --  2,890  2,890  2,890  13,600  45,356 
Optimal Environmental Policy        
Land subsidy (NT$/ha)  0  339  486  193  -97  -1390 
Water subsidy (NT$/ton)  0.00  0.0401  0.0462  0.0249  0.0339  0.0282 
Fertilizer tax (NT$/ton)  0.0 59.3  59.3  59.3 279.0  930.3 
Resource Allocation  % Change From Base (A) 
Production (thousand tons raw rice)  1,724  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2  -0.1 
Land planted to rice (1,000 ha)  332  7.6  7.9  7.4  7.0  5.1 
Labor (1,000 persons)  231  -1.3  -1.4  -1.2  -0.8  0.4 
Water (10
7  tons)  804  10.4  11.9 6.5 9.0 8.0 
Fertilizer (1,000 tons)  829  -2.4 -2.5 -2.2 -3.4 -6.4 
Groundwater recharge  278   9.5  10.6  6.8  8.3  7.1 
Methane emission (10
3 tons)  35.5   2.3  2.4  2.1  1.5  -0.7 
Prices and Revenue         
Imputed land rent (NT$1,000/ha)  27.2  -38.9  -38.6  -39.1  -39.5  -41.4 
Wages  (NT$1,000/person)  77.8 -1.6 -1.7 -1.5 -1.1  0.5 
Fertilizer Price (NT$1,000/ton)  8  -1.2 -1.3 -1.1 -1.7 -3.3 
Water price (NT$/ton)  0.08  39.1  45.5  23.2  33.3  29.4 
Farm price of rice (NT$1,000/ton)  18.3  -3.2  -3.4  -2.9  -2.1  1.1 
Farm revenue (NT$10
8)
b 382.5    -18.9 -18.7 -19.2 -19.1 -19.3 
Welfare Analysis         
Consumer surplus (NT$10
10)  19.70 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.4  -0.2 
Producer surplus (NT$10
10)  2.10 -21.4 -21.1 -21.9 -21.6 -21.7 
Domestic payments (NT$10
7)  674  -93.6 -92.0 -96.5 -99.4  -114.3 
Groundwater recharge value (NT$10
7) 947  0.5  32.7  -31.8  0.4  0.4 
Methane emission value (NT$10
7) 10.3  2.3  2.4  2.1  377.5  1458.1 
Social welfare (NT$10
10)  22.1 1.4 2.8 0.0 1.2 0.6 
a Scenarios A and C are the same as those in simulations A and C in Table 3. Scenarios G, H, I, and J embody the same assump-
tions as scenario C, except for the parameter values for WTP and Me indicated above. 
b Includes domestic policy payments. 
 The substantial redistributive impact of the 
change in policy aims (as evidenced by the 




The approach developed in this paper demon-
strates how optimal policies for the supply of 
non-commodity (environmental) attributes asso-
ciated with Taiwanese rice production can be de-
termined. We have shown that a policy aimed at 
securing an appropriate supply of a major positive 
attribute—groundwater recharge—and containing 
a negative attribute—methane emissions—would 
require policy re-instrumentation. Taxes and sub-
sidies on inputs used in rice production would 
need to replace the price and income support 
measures currently used. We have also shown 
that the modest liberalization of trade that has 
taken place since Taiwan joined the World Trade 
Organization is not inconsistent with achieving 
key environmental objectives. Recognizing that 
the specific numerical results are sensitive to pa-
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rameter values, we have demonstrated the robust-
ness of the qualitative conclusions on appropriate 
policy design under substantial variation in the 
valuation parameters for environmental attributes. 
  Although the results obtained may not be gener-
ally applicable to other countries and agricultural 
systems, we believe that they shed some light on 
two important issues surrounding the debate on 
multifunctionality. 
  The first is that a policy approach that treats 
non-commodity attributes in agriculture as secon-
dary objectives to existing aims, such as income 
support, may well result in sub-optimal outcomes. 
As the Taiwan case demonstrates, it does not fol-
low that the pursuit of income support goals 
through the use of traditional policy measures will 
result in the desired supply of environmental 
goods. It may be possible to achieve that supply 
at far lower costs, both to the government and to 
society as a whole, if policy instruments are em-
ployed that are more suited to achieving environ-
mental goals than existing measures. If it is in-
deed the case, as some would argue, that agricul-
ture’s role in the supply of environmental goods 
is increasingly important, it may not be appropri-
ate or sufficient to make marginal adjustments in 
the settings of existing agricultural policy instru-
ments to achieve the desired outcome; a more 
radical redesign of policy may be required. This 
may have significant redistributive implications, 
particularly through reductions in income and 
asset values at the farm level. Consideration may 
have to be given to addressing these issues if the 
redesign of policy is to be politically feasible and 
is to help control farmers’ entry and exit from 
agriculture. 
  A second issue illuminated by our analysis is 
that agricultural trade liberalization may not be 
inconsistent with the pursuit of domestic envi-
ronmental objectives. Put differently, our results 
provide empirical evidence supporting the early 
arguments by Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963), 
as well as others, that trade policy should not be 
used to correct domestic distortions. In our con-
text, the distortions created by the lack of markets 
for the positive and negative externalities associ-
ated with agricultural production are best ad-
dressed directly through domestic taxes and sub-
sidies on inputs, while at the same time allowing 
consumers to benefit from lower product prices 
resulting from reduced import protection. The 
maintenance of high product prices through im-
port protection seems an inefficient way to 
achieve environmental aims, and could run 
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